ABSTRACT Modern distribution power system has become a typical cyber-physical system (CPS), where reliable automation control process is heavily depending on the accurate measurement data. However, the cyber-attacks on CPS may manipulate the measurement data and mislead the control system to make incorrect operational decisions. Two types of cyber-attacks (e.g., transient cyber-attacks and steady cyberattacks) as well as their attack templates are modeled in this paper. To effectively and accurately detect these false data injections, a multivariate Gaussian based anomaly detection method is proposed. The correlation features of comprehensive measurement data captured by micro-phasor measurement units (µPMU) are developed to train multivariate Gaussian models for the anomaly detection of transient and steady cyberattacks, respectively. A k-means clustering method is introduced to reduce the number of µPMUs and select the placement of µPMUs. Numerical simulations on the IEEE 34 bus system show that the proposed method can effectively detect the false data injections on measurement sensors of distribution systems.
communication technologies facilitate opponents to tamper cyber networks in power system. The existence of cyber threats in CPS, such as cyber components failures, security risks, and cyber-attacks, can readily lead to the abnormal operation or even cascading outages of the entire power grid by propagating from a single point failure in cyber networks. For example, the ''Ukrainian Blackout'' [7] in 2015 was a typical cyber-physical cascading failure caused by malicious cyber-attacks, which aroused widespread concerns in the cyber security of power system operations.
The existing researches investigate the countermeasures against cyber-attacks from different approaches, such as vulnerability assessment [8] , anomaly detection [9] [10] [11] , and attack mitigation [12] , [13] . From the perspective of anomaly detection, the identification methods of corrupted measurement data have widely attracted interests of worldwide scholars. Game theories are introduced to quantify the security risk in cyber networks [9] , [14] . Petri net is leveraged to describe the information flows among the components in CPS of power systems [10] , [15] . Also, some statistical methods are investigated in the detection of false measurement data. For example, Cui et al. [11] developed a machine learning based anomaly detection method for tampered load forecasting data. Wang et al. [16] established a distributed framework based on the deep auto-encoder to detect the manipulated data. Esmalifalak et al. [17] utilized both supervised and unsupervised learning methods for the detection of stealthy attack. Among these statistical methods, comprehensive variables of essential measurement data are the key feature for successfully identifying CPS anomalies. However, compared with the transmission-level grid, the real-time condition in distribution grids is not sufficiently monitored by distribution system operators (DSOs). To acquire situational awareness on the CPS of distribution grids, there is a growing need in the enhancement of sensors.
Recently, micro-phasor measurement units (µPMUs) have been widely developed to capture operational states in the distribution-level systems. Compared with the traditional supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system with minute-level power flow sampling rates, µPMUs can capture the voltage and current phasors with significantly higher sampling rates [18] , e.g., 30 Hz in [19] , 50 Hz in [20] , 60 Hz in [21] , 100 Hz in [22] , and 120 Hz in [23] . The applications of µPMUs and PMUs have been discussed in plenty of literatures [18] , [23] [24] [25] . Cui et al. [18] proposed a novel event detection methodology using huge amount of PMU data. Jamei et al. [23] established an abnormal behavior detection framework based on optimal placement of µPMUs in distribution grid. Gomez et al. [24] trained a support vector machines classifier to predict post-fault transient stability status based on the transient data acquired from PMU. Li and Yang applied an ensemble of OS-extreme learning machine with binary Java based feature selection to predicting the transient stability status of power system by using PMU data [25] . However, there are few applications for the anomaly detection of CPS in distribution systems by using µPMUs data as the analytical and statistical basis.
In this paper, we mainly focus on two types of false data injection attacks (i.e., transient attacks and steady attacks) in CPS of distribution grids. A multivariate Gaussian based anomaly detection method is proposed to identify abnormal CPS events by using variables of measurements acquired from µPMUs. Firstly, the templates of two types of false data injection cyber-attacks are introduced and modeled in Section II. In Section III, a multivariate Gaussian based machine learning method is developed for the CPS anomaly detection considering both transient and steady cyber-attacks. Section IV provides a method for the selection of µPMU placement to reduce the number of µPMU devices in distribution systems. Case studies as well as numerical results are discussed in Section V. Conclusions are summarized in Section VI.
II. CYBER-ATTACK TEMPLATE
According to the IEEE PES Distribution automation working group [26] , the modern distribution system is automatically controlled to enable DSOs to remotely monitor, coordinate, and operate local distribution devices and components in a real-time mode. Thus, the opponents may mislead the DSOs into inaccurate operational decisions by stealthily injecting false data into local measurement sensors. In this paper, two types of false data injection attacks (i.e. transient attacks and steady attacks) are investigated. Inspired by cyber-attack templates mentioned in [11] , the templates of transient attack and steady attack are considered as step attack and ramping attack, respectively.
A. STEP ATTACK
The representative template of transient cyber-attack is a step attack, which modifies the measurement values in a specific duration multiplied by a parameter p s :
whereṀ t is the tampered measurement value at time t. M t is the original measurement value at timet. t s and t e are the start and end time of one transient cyber-attack, respectively. The aim of transient cyber-attacks is to simulate a ''system fault'' by injecting step overcurrent or low-voltage data into corresponding measurement sensors, as shown in Fig. 1a . The duration of transient cyber-attack is so short (e.g., 0.1s∼0.2s) that the SCADA cannot detect this anomaly event. However, if the step parameter is selected sophisticatedly and implemented on the critical sensors of protection system, the fault detector would be deceived with the tampered transient measurements to alarm a fault. Under this situation, the distribution automation system would be misguided to isolate ''fault area'' by tripping the protective relays, which would cause unnecessary outages in distribution systems.
B. RAMPING ATTACK
The steady cyber-attack can be represented as a slowly ramping attack, which modifies the measurement values to rise (or decline) gradually with time:
where p r is the ramping parameter. p r > 0 denotes an up-ramping cyber attack, while p r < 0 represents a downramping attack.
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Unlike transient cyber-attacks, steady cyber-attacks may not show distinct transient features. Instead, they inject consistent and slowly ramping false data into measurement sensors, which are more challenging to be detected by visualization. Due to the false data tampered by cyber attackers, the control center in distribution systems may send incorrect operational decisions from DSOs. For instance, as shown in Fig. 1b , if the value of voltage V 1 is manipulated by a ramping attack, the control center would be deceived under the ''over voltage'' condition. The transformer tap would be changed to lower the system's voltage, which may further decrease the voltage V 2 to the low-voltage condition.
III. ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD
In this section, we assume that it is unrealistic for opponents to implement successful cyber intrusion in each variable of measurements simultaneously. The most economical way is to manipulate some critical measurement data that can influence the estimation of automatically controlled system. Under this circumstance, the correlations between variables of comprehensive measurements captured by µPMUs can be investigated to detect the anomalies. In this section, a machine learning based anomaly detection method using the multivariate Gaussian model is proposed to detect transient and steady cyber-attacks according to different correlation features. Two design methods of features for transient and steady cyber-attack detection are illustrated as follows. 
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A. MULTIVARIATE GAUSSIAN MODEL
In probability theory and statistics, the multivariate Gaussian distribution is a generalization of the one-dimensional Gaussian distribution to higher dimensions. Compared with one-dimensional Gaussian model, multivariate Gaussian model can capture the correlations between variables from different dimensions by formulating and calculating a covariance matrix. In the field of applications, the multivariate Gaussian model has been widely used in the abnormal signal detection [27] , [28] . The basic idea is to train a multivariate Gaussian model of the samples with multiple features, and judge whether a new sample is homogenous or abnormal by measuring its probability. As shown in Fig. 2 , an example of two-dimensional Gaussian distribution is presented. The anomaly event is flagged when the joint probability is below a threshold. It should be noted that the algorithm defaults to Gaussian distribution for all features. If the samples do not present a Gaussian distribution on a certain feature, they can be converted to a Gaussian distribution, such as log transformation, square root transformation, reciprocal transformation, etc. If the distribution of a feature is too complicated to be converted to a Gaussian distribution, especially when the distribution of the feature has multiple extremums, it can not be trained in the multivariate Gaussian model.
Given a training set
where N T is the number of training set.x is the feature vector.
x m is the mean vector of the training set. is the covariance matrix. Given a new examplex, we can compute p(x) by using (3). An anomaly event would be flagged if p(x) < ε, where ε is the threshold used for anomaly detection.
A greedy algorithm is applied to select the threshold ε. First, we calculate p(x CV ) through a cross-validation set
CV )}, where N CV is the number of cross-validation set.x CV is the feature vector in the cross-validation set. y CV is the anomaly flag that y CV = 1 for abnormal features and y CV = 0 for normal features. For each ε ∈ [min(p(x CV )), max(p(x CV ))], we can evaluate the performance of ε through a matching set
CV )} by calculating F 1 score:
f r = n tp n tp + n fn (8) where f p is the precision metric. f r is the recall metric. n tp is the number of true positives that indicate p(x CV ) = 1 and y CV = 1. n fp is the number of false positives that indicate p(x CV ) = 1 and y CV = 0. n fn is the number of false negatives that indicate p(x CV ) = 0 and
Theε with a maximum F 1 score is finally used as the threshold for the anomaly detection.
B. TRANSIENT CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION
Based on the high sampling rate of µPMU, the transient event on measurements can be readily captured and detected. In this section, an anomaly detection method is proposed for transient cyber-attacks, which aims to simulate system faults by injecting transient measurements. In this study, the monitored measurements are the magnitudes of three-phase voltage, three-phase current, three-phase active power, and three-phase reactive power. There are 12 types of measurement data monitored for cyber-attack detection.
T denotes a sequence of captured measurements, where N S is the number of captured samples in a data sequence. A transient event is alarmed if there exists a data point i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N S } for which any of the following holds:
whereM is the mean value of data sequence. σ is the sample standard deviation of the data sequence. The flowchart of a transient event detection is presented in Fig. 2 . At each instant of time, the readings (a data sequence with a predefined window) are calculated according to (9) . Once a transient event is found, the start time t s and the end time t e are recorded, and the data sequence from t s to t e is leveraged to develop the transient feature. The fluctuation M in this data sequence is determined by:
where | | denotes the absolute value. For a three-phase measurement, the maximum fluctuation in the three-phase measurement is regarded as a transient feature.
The transient feature vectorx T in this paper is a fourdimensional vector, which includes transient voltage feature, transient current feature, transient active power feature, and transient reactive power feature. To train a multivariate Gaussian model, all of the system faults (including single phase to ground fault, 2-phase to ground fault, phase-phase fault, and 3-phase fault) at different locations as well as some transient cyber-attack templates are simulated to acquire transient featuresx T . A suspicious transient cyber-attack is alarmed if p(x T ) < ε.
C. STEADY CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION
In the steady operation, the voltage values of buses may be tempered and modified by the opponent, which aims to mislead operational decisions of the control center. An anomaly detection method for steady cyber-attacks on voltage is proposed in this section to alarm when the suspicious voltage value is detected.
Under n different network conditions, the voltage of busi can be represented as a n-dimensional
T , where V ij is the voltage value of bus i under network condition j(j = 1, 2, · · · n). Assume two of these buses are matched into a pair set (v A ,v B ), wherê 
T is the vector of predicted voltage values of bus B in m pair sets.
T is the vector of monitored voltage values of bus B in m pair sets.x S is a m-dimensional feature vector that is used for steady cyber-attack detection. The number of pair sets is determined by the placement of µPMUs. In this paper, the adjacent buses equipped with µPMUs are matched into a pair set. The placement selection of µPMU is illustrated in Section IV.
IV. PLACEMENT SELECTION FOR µPMU
It is challenging to place µPMU at each bus in a large-scale distribution grid due to the cost. Thus, it is necessary to VOLUME 7, 2019 select specific buses for the placement of limited µPMUs. For a radial distribution network, the voltage profiles at different nodes are generally determined by the node position, load fluctuations, and renewables fluctuations, etc. Therefore, the voltage profiles at the same branches or areas would be similar. In this section, a k-means clustering method is leveraged to divide the distribution network into multiple areas, where the voltage profiles are similar. The bus with centroid voltage in each cluster set is placed at least one µPMU to represent the characteristics of this area.
Given a distribution grid with L buses, voltages of L buses under n different load conditions are observed as (v 1v2 · · ·v L ), where
T is a n-dimensional voltage vector for bus i. The observation sets (v 1v2 · · ·v L ) can be divided into multiple clusters by using k-means clustering method, which can partition L bus voltage vectors into K voltage cluster sets C = {C 1 C 2 · · · C K } by minimizing the within-cluster sum of squares:
whereμ i is the centroid voltage vector in the i-th voltage cluster set C i (i= 1, 2, · · · K ). K is the number of voltage cluster sets.v is the n-dimensional voltage vector in voltage cluster set C i . n i is the number of voltage vectors in cluster set C i . There is at least one µPMU for each voltage cluster set C i . The bus with the most similar voltage profile as the centroid voltage vector is selected as the centroid bus for the placement of µPMU. This objective can be achieved by selecting the minimal squared Euclidean distance between the bus's voltage vector and the centroid voltage vector:
wherev j is the voltage vector of bus j in cluster set C i . Then bus j will be selected for the placement of µPMU.
To estimate the number of cluster sets in the k-means clustering method, set a cost function of K :
where W K (K ) represents the pooled within-cluster sum of squares around K centroids. K is the number of cluster sets. µ i is the centroid voltage vector in the i-th voltage cluster set C i .v j is the voltage vector of bus j in cluster set C i . C i is the i-th voltage cluster set that is divided by the k-means clustering method.
By plotting the curve of W K with K as the abscissa, the elbow point should be the number of clusters. In this paper, 500 load conditions in an unbalanced distribution grid (IEEE 34 bus system) are considered and simulated through OpenDSS [29] , [30] for the bus's voltage clustering. Therefore, the voltages on the buses are 500-dimensional vectors. These voltage vectors can be divided into K clusters based on the k-means clustering method. With different number of the clusters, the function W K (K ) in (16) is plotted in Fig. 3 . As the increase of the number of the cluster sets, the value of the cost function decreases, and the elbow point is found when K = 6. Therefore, the IEEE 34 bus system is divided into 6 areas, as shown in Fig. 4 . According to (15) , the centroid buses are bus 808 for area 1, bus 816 for area 2, bus 820 for area 3, bus 854 for area 4, bus 890 for area 5, and bus 834 for area 6. It should be noted that if the budget allows, the proposed method would perform better when multiple µPMUs are placed in the same area. In this paper, each area is placed with only one µPMU at each centroid bus. 
V. NUMERRICAL TEST
The proposed method is tested on IEEE 34 bus system as the Fig. 4 , where 6 µPMUs are placed on bus 808, bus 816, bus 820, bus 854, bus 890, and bus 834, respectively. The numerical simulation is conducted on a 64-bit computer with an Intel Core i5 CPU of 2.30GHz and 8GB RAM. The proposed algorithms are implemented in the MATLAB platform.
A. TRANSIENT ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, 10 types of faults, including single phase (a, b, and c) to ground fault, phase to phase (a-b, b-c, and c-a) fault, 2 phase (ab, bc, and ca) to ground fault, and 3 phase fault, are simulated at each node and each distribution lines of the IEEE 34 bus system. Therefore, a multivariate Gaussian model p(x T ) is derived from the transient features, such as maximum current fluctuation, maximum current fluctuation, maximum active power fluctuation, and maximum reactive power fluctuation, based on 400 different system fault conditions. In cross-validation, 100 system fault conditions and 100 transient false data injection conditions are simulated to select the threshold. For each transient false data injection condition, the measurements of current, voltage, active power and reactive power under the normal condition are randomly selected to be injected with simulated false data under the fault condition. The threshold is determined as 0.99 × 10 −3 .
A transient even is firstly captured by the µPMUs, which then input the transient features to the trained multivariate Gaussian model p(x T ) to identify whether it is a system fault or cyber-attack. For instance, a single phase (a-phase) to ground fault is simulated on line 824-828 at 0.1s and cleared at 0.2s. The transient event captured by µPMU 1 at bus 808 is shown in Fig. 5 . With the captured start time t s and the captured end time t e , the measurement sequence between t s and t e is leveraged to establish the transient featuresx T . By comparing p(x T ) and the threshold, the anomaly would be flagged. To validate the effectiveness of the trained multivariate Gaussian model p(x T ), 200 system fault conditions as well as 100 transient false data injection conditions are simulated. The test result is shown in Fig. 6 . According to the calculation results of multivariate Gaussian model, there is a significant distinction in the value of probability p(x T ) between system fault conditions and cyber attacked conditions. In Fig. 6 , the anomalies that represent cyber attacked conditions have extreme small values of probabilities (between 0.99 × 10 −5 to 0.99 × 10 −5 ), while the most probabilities of system fault conditions are around 0.99 × 10 −3 to 1.
B. STEADY ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, 500 cases of IEEE 34 bus system under different load conditions are considered and simulated based on the OpenDSS platform. The voltage values of 6 centroid buses under 500 network conditions are presented in Fig. 7 . As shown in Fig. 7 , there are many scenarios where the voltages of centroid buses exceed the upper boundary of 1.1 p.u. or drop below the lower boundary of 0.9 p.u. Thus, the opponent can inject false voltage data into measurement sensors of centroid buses to pretend a low-voltage condition or over-voltage condition, which may mislead the control center to change the transformer tap and influence the system's voltage under normal operations. x 3 =V 854 − V 854
T is the prediction error vector as well as the feature vector for steady cyber-attack detection. There are 500 feature vectors developed based on simulation results of the IEEE 34 bus system under different load conditions, and 400 of these feature vectors are leveraged to train a multivariate Gaussian model. The other 100 feature vectors of normal load conditions with another created 100 cyber-attack conditions are used for cross-validation. The cyber-attack conditions are created based on the attack template of ramping attacks, where the deviation range of tampered voltage data is randomly changed between 0.01 to 0.1. With 100 abnormal features and 100 normal features in crossvalidation test, 1.99 × 10 −8 is chosen as the threshold to identify the steady cyber-attacks.
A sensitivity test for the selected threshold to flag an anomaly is implemented in this section. The result is shown in Fig. 9 . The voltage data of the centroid bus (V 816 , V 820 , V 854 , V 834 , and V 890 ) is manipulated and increased gradually from 0 to 0.02. With the increase of the deviation between tampered voltage data and predicted voltage value, the probabilities calculated by p(x S ) are reduced. As shown in Fig. 9 , with the increasing deviation of tampered voltage data, the value of p(x S ) is decreasing severely. The most sensitive buses are V 816 and V 854 , because they are used most frequently in the linear regression models and influence more features in multivariate Gaussian model. The V 890 is the least sensitive because the prediction of V 890 based on V 854 is the most inaccurate among 5 linear regression models, as shown in Fig. 8 . This is because the bus 854 and bus 890 belong to the different voltage levels, which cause a weaker correlation compared with other pair sets. However, the detection performance is still good as the anomaly of V 890 is flagged when the tampered deviation exceeds 0.014 p.u., within which the tampered voltage value cannot mislead the voltage control. Thus, the detection sensitivity of a specific bus can be improved when a more accurate linear regression model is developed. Fig. 9 and the results of normal condition test in Fig. 10 , it can be observed that the detection is more accurate but less sensitive with the decrease of the threshold. Thus, the threshold should be determined experientially to obtain a better compromise between detection accuracy and detection sensitivity.
C. DISCUSSION
The proposed method can detect the false data by training one classifier (one multivariate Gaussian model), because the multivariate Gaussian model can capture the correlations between variables from different dimensions by itself with the covariance matrix. In MATLAB, the training of a multivariate model with 1000 10-dimensional training samples costs less than 5 seconds. Concretely, in this paper, there are 600 4-dimensional samples (400 training samples and 200 cross-validation samples) of the transient cyber-attacks, and 600 5-dimensional samples (400 training samples and 200 cross-validation samples) of the steady cyber-attacks. The proposed approach is computationally effective to be used in practical applications as the model training can be accomplished by off-line calculation with historical data.
In the result of the transient cyber-attacks detection, both the accuracy and precision perform well as the distinction of the probabilities between system fault conditions and cyber-attack conditions is significant (as shown in Fig. 6 ). The reason is that we assume it unrealistic for opponents to implement successful cyber intrusion in each variable of measurements simultaneously. If any of the monitored measurement is not tampered, the feature of the normal operation fluctuations would lead to very small probability value in the multivariate Gaussian distribution. However, in the result of the steady cyber-attacks detection, the feature is established based on the prediction error, which can be influenced by some extraordinary network conditions. Generally, the threshold should be determined experientially to obtain a better compromise between the detection accuracy and the detection sensitivity. In this paper, the threshold is determined by maximizing the F 1 score in (6) . From the comparison between Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , when the threshold is set higher, the detection is more sensitive to both the anomalies and the normal conditions with higher prediction errors. Therefore, an improved regression model with lower prediction errors can contribute to the detection accuracy based on the multivariate Gaussian model.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the detection of false data injected in the measurement sensors of CPS in distribution systems. A multivariate Gaussian based anomaly detection method is developed to identify transient and steady cyber-attacks. The comprehensive measurements in distribution systems can be acquired by µPMUs for statistical analysis. The multivariate features are established by formulating correlations among different variables of measurement data. A cyber-attack event is flagged when its probability in the multivariate Gaussian distribution is below a selected threshold. The threshold is determined by maximizing the F 1 score. The k-means clustering method is used to divide the distribution system into areas with similar voltage profiles, which are leveraged to formulate the linear regression models between the adjacent centroid voltage buses placed with the µPMUs. The numerical test is simulated on the IEEE 34 bus system. The test result has shown the proposed approach is sensitive to the false data injection and is computationally effective to be used in practical applications. In this paper, there is a trade-off between the detection accuracy and the detection sensitivity when selecting the threshold. In the future studies, the regression model should be improved to decrease prediction errors, which can contribute to more accurate regression model will contribute to the detection accuracy as well as the detection sensitivity.
